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Abstract 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) found that lifeguards do not consistently report incidents 
when free-viewing aquatic scenes and miss some incidents that should be 
considered critical. This could have been because they did not know what 
incidents were critical to monitor or because they were busy monitoring other 
incidents. In the current study, lifeguards and non-lifeguards were presented with 
video clips of isolated incidents and rated the severity of each on a scale of 0 – 7. 
The lifeguards reported greater mean and maximum incident severity than non-
lifeguards. Further analyses of lifeguard responses revealed that severity ratings 
were only moderately correlated to the report rate in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012). 
Some of the incidents, though under-reported in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012), were 
given high severity ratings when isolated in the current study. It is proposed that 
lack of report in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) may have occurred due to attention being 
diverted to other critical incidents. Future research should utilize eye-tracking to 
assess the relationship between severity and monitoring. 
Keywords: lifeguarding, drowning, distress, incident severity 
What incidents and behaviors should a lifeguard monitor? A lifeguard’s primary 
task is to prevent drowning incidents, but they are also responsible for preventing 
other physical injuries to patrons. Because the risk for drowning and injuries 
stems from personal characteristics (e.g., physical weakness, lack of swimming 
skill), risky behaviors (e.g., horseplay, venturing into deep water without 
appropriate skill), and even environmental conditions (e.g., inclement weather, rip 
currents), open water lifeguards have numerous diverse things to monitor that 
may happen concurrently. How they balance these diverse factors has not been 
thoroughly explored, although in theory, the task is monumentally difficult due to 
several known cognitive limitations (see Lanagan-Leitzel, Skow, & Moore, 2015 
for a review). 
Allocation of attention from moment to moment during surveillance is 
most likely a product of personal judgment of the relative severity of incidents 
occurring at any particular moment. An actual drowning incident warrants an 
immediate rescue, but most incidents that lifeguards face are only potential 
drowning incidents that contain risk factors that may increase the likelihood of 
drowning. Lifeguards are often faced with large numbers of patrons (Griffiths, 
Steel, & Vogelsong, 1996) engaging in a myriad of activities. The incident-related 
factors highlighted above (e.g., insufficient swimming skill, horseplay, 
encountering deep water) are likely very common. Lifeguards must prioritize 
these incidents in order to have any chance of success at preventing drowning and 
injury; those behaviors and conditions that are most severe must be monitored 
more often and with more attention, and those that are less severe should be 
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monitored but perhaps less often and with less focused attention. It is unclear how 
lifeguards learn to judge the severity of incidents and prioritize accordingly; no 
explicit guidance is given in several prominent lifeguard manuals (American Red 
Cross, 2007; Brewster, 2003; YMCA 2001). It is possible that they acquire these 
judgment skills by trial and error once they begin work or may not acquire them 
at all. 
How might the acquisition of judgment and prioritization skills affect 
performance in the field? Submersions, for example, must be monitored to ensure 
that the person returns to the surface. However, a lifeguard cannot stare at the 
location of a single, briefly-submerged person because s/he will miss other 
incidents occurring simultaneously. The severity of any submersion incident 
likely is low the moment it occurs but grows as the time spent underwater 
increases. Other critical incidents occurring while the patron is submerged may 
compete for the lifeguard’s limited attention and may lead to a disruption of 
monitoring or an impairment in priority assessment. In order to perform the task 
well, lifeguards must rely on their short-term memory to keep track of patrons. 
Short-term memory has been shown to be limited in capacity (e.g., perhaps as few 
as four items by Cowan, 2001 to as many as seven items by Miller, 1956), but 
almost all short-term memory studies have used naïve participants in laboratory 
studies and not trained professionals in the field. 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) asked lifeguards, lifeguard instructors, and non-
lifeguards to view videos of regular aquatic activity from several venues (i.e., 
ocean, lake, swimming pool) and to identify all the incidents that they thought 
were critical for a lifeguard to monitor. The responses by the experienced 
lifeguard instructors were considered to be a baseline. Only a few incidents were 
identified by a large proportion of the lifeguard instructors (i.e., 14 incidents were 
identified by at least 70% of the instructors). The lifeguards did not always report 
these same incidents and as a group were largely inconsistent in the incidents that 
they identified. The incidents identified in that study were primarily submersion, 
unattended children, weak swimmers, water depth, and horseplay. These incidents 
were consistent with guidelines taught to lifeguards, yet, the inconsistency of 
reporting them among the lifeguards was troubling. 
One explanation for the reporting inconsistency in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) 
was that lifeguards (at least the ones in that study) may not have known which 
incidents were critical to monitor. Although this explanation seems unlikely, it 
should be considered because as a group they had only an average of 2.5 years of 
experience as lifeguards. The study participants were Connecticut lifeguards 
viewing local facilities, so it was possible that some of the incidents were so 
commonplace in their experience that they did not attend to or report them. A 
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second explanation, consistent with the previous review, could have been that the 
lifeguards did not report all of the incidents because they were too busy paying 
attention to other incidents, even ones that were less severe. In other words, 
perhaps the lifeguards did not have the skill to judge and prioritize incident 
severity and their short term memory was overloaded due to the multiple incidents 
occurring at each point in time. The videos contained many swimmers and it 
certainly was impossible to attend to everything all the time, given the limited 
attention capacity of humans. Even studies in the fields of radiology and cognitive 
psychology (see Cain & Mitroff, 2013 for a review) have shown that when two 
targets are presented concurrently, people often fail to identify one of the two, 
even if they look directly at it (Hout, Walenchok, Goldinger, & Wolfe, 2015). 
Although these studies are laboratory experiments of single trials as opposed to a 
surveillance task, it is reasonable to suppose that the same cognitive mechanisms 
could be affecting performance here. 
To explore the possibility that lack of report by lifeguards in Lanagan-
Leitzel (2012) was due to attentional engagement as opposed to knowledge 
failure, several critical incidents were isolated from the stimulus videos used in 
that study. A new sample of lifeguards and non-lifeguards viewed these isolated 
incidents and provided a rating of severity for each. It was expected that there 
would be a relationship between the ratings of severity and the reporting rates in 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012). A strong relationship would indicate that reporting rates 
in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) were due to severity. A weaker relationship would 
indicate that reporting rates in that study were unrelated to severity. If so, this 
would suggest that failure to report the incidents found in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) 
may have been due to limited capacity attention being diverted to other, 
potentially less severe, incidents which would be a symptom of attentional 
engagement across the scene and not a lack of knowledge about the severity of 
those incidents (i.e., knowledge failure). 
Method 
Participants 
Students at Eastern Connecticut State University who were lifeguards (N = 23, 20 
females, average age 20.7 years) and non-lifeguards (N = 62, 49 females, average 
age 19.5 years) participated in this study in exchange for psychology department 
research credit. One additional lifeguard (male, age 21 years) and three additional 
non-lifeguards (two males, age 19 and 20 years, and one female, age 18 years) 
had to be excluded from the study due to computer error. The lifeguards 
completed a demographic questionnaire prior to participation. They reported an 
average of 2.9 years of lifeguard work experience (range: 1 – 7), although 14 of 
the lifeguards reported only summer work, so this estimate of work experience is 
skewed high. Their typical work day was between six and eight hours in length, 
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three to seven days per week. They were asked to indicate all types of aquatic 
environments in which they worked; overwhelmingly, they reported exclusively 
pool experience (N = 12) or pool experience along with other venues (N = 6) 
including open-water venues such as rivers, lakes, or the ocean. Only two had 
experience in exclusively open-water venues. Most (N = 19) reported certification 
by the American Red Cross, while three reported certification with Ellis and 
Associates and one did not provide a certifying agency. 
Stimuli 
One hundred video clips of critical incidents identified in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) 
were prepared. In that previous study, participants had viewed 20 videos that were 
two minutes in length each. The original videos were recorded of normal 
swimming activity at five different venues across Connecticut: two ocean 
beaches, two lake beaches, and the indoor recreational swimming pool at the 
author’s university (four videos per venue). The ocean beaches border Long 
Island Sound and are low surf, with very large designated swimming areas 
demarcated by buoys. The lakes had relatively small designated swimming areas 
demarcated with buoys and ropes, with fishing and watersport areas outside the 
ropes. Lifeguards were on duty at all but one venue (a lake). The clips in the 
current study were prepared by isolating a brief segment (3 – 20 seconds) from a 
particular stimulus video and overlaying a yellow ring over one incident in the 
clip at that time. The purpose of this ring was to draw the participants’ focused 
attention directly to that incident for evaluation. Each of the original stimulus 
videos from Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) contained between one and nine of the 
isolated incidents tested in this study. 
Task and Procedure 
The 100 video clips were displayed on a Dell desktop computer running Matlab 
with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Participants 
watched each of the video clips in a shuffled order, promoting variation of venue 
from trial to trial. Each participant was asked to report the severity of the incident 
in the yellow circle via key press using a scale of 0 – 7, where 0 indicated that the 
incident was not severe/dangerous at all and a 7 indicated that it was extremely 
severe/dangerous. Pressing the 9 key allowed the participant to repeat the clip to 
facilitate their judgment, and they were allowed to do this on any clip as many 
times as they wished. This was done because some of the clips were very short. 
Participants used this replay option most often in the short clips. Each session 
began with administering informed consent and the demographic survey assessing 
lifeguard experience. This study was approved by the university’s IRB. 
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Results 
There were several differences observed between the lifeguards and non-
lifeguards in the severity ratings. The lifeguards had a higher mean severity rating 
(2.93) compared to the non-lifeguards (2.43, t(83) = 2.33, p = .023) and a higher 
maximum severity rating (average 6.78) compared to the non-lifeguards (6.42, 
t(83) = 2.07, p = .042). Eighteen (78%) of the lifeguards used the highest severity 
rating at least once whereas only 37 (60%) of the non-lifeguards used the highest 
severity rating. Despite these differences, the severity ratings reported by 
lifeguards to the individual video clips were highly correlated to the severity 
ratings reported by the non-lifeguards to those same clips, r(98) = .948, p < .001. 
This high degree of correlation suggests that lifeguards and non-lifeguards were 
similar in their determination of which events were more severe than others; they 
differed only in their assessment of the degree of severity, with lifeguards 
favoring slightly higher severity ratings than non-lifeguards.  
Lifeguard Severity Ratings 
The primary goal of this study was to determine whether severity ratings of the 
incidents reported in this study correlated with the rate of reporting of those same 
incidents in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012). This was done to examine whether severe 
incidents were missed in that study due to attentional engagement with other 
incidents or simply lack of awareness of the incident severity. The average 
severity ratings provided by lifeguards in this study correlated with the percent of 
lifeguards who reported those same events in the previous study, r(98) = .223, p = 
.026, the percent of instructors who reported them in the previous study, r(98) = 
.325, p = .001, and also the percent of non-lifeguards who reported them in the 
previous study, r(98) = .208, p = .038. Although the correlation between severity 
ratings in the current study and lifeguard report rates in the previous study is 
statistically significant due to sample size, it is fairly weak, accounting for only 
5% of the variance for lifeguard reports in the previous study and only 11% of the 
variance for lifeguard instructor reports in the previous study. This may indicate 
that some of the severe incidents (at least as identified in the current study) had 
gone unreported in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) and that other factors besides severity 
could have led to reporting in that study. 
Non-Lifeguard Severity Ratings 
The severity ratings provided by non-lifeguards in the current study also 
correlated to the percent of non-lifeguards who reported those same events in the 
previous study, r(98) = .240, p = .016, as well as the percent of lifeguards who 
reported those same events in the previous study, r(98) = .212, p = .034, and even 
the percent of lifeguard instructors who reported those same events in the 
previous study, r(98) = .348, p < .001. As with the lifeguards, these correlations 
are statistically significant due to sample size, but weak, accounting for only 6% 
5
Lanagan-Leitzel: Aquatic Incident Severity
Published by ScholarWorks@BGSU, 2019
of the variance for non-lifeguard reports in the previous study. Recall that the 
correlation between lifeguard severity ratings and lifeguard report rates in the 
previous study was r = .223 and the correlation between non-lifeguard severity 
ratings and non-lifeguard report rates in the previous study was r = .240. These 
correlations are not very different, suggesting that very little of the variance in 
reporting rates can be explained by differences in assessments of severity, for 
either group of participants. 
Repeat Requests 
Every trial afforded the possibility of repeating the video prior to making a 
judgment, giving the participant the opportunity to be “sure” of his/her response. 
For the lifeguards, the rate of repetition was uncorrelated with reported severity, 
r(98) = .018, ns, but was correlated with the length of the video clip, r(98) = -
.301, p = .002. For the non-lifeguards, the rate of repetition was also uncorrelated 
with reported severity, r(98) = -.012, ns, but was also correlated with the length of 
the video clip, r(98) = -.349, p < .001. Thus, repetition was primarily a function of 
the length of the clip in the current study, with shorter video clips being repeated 
more often than longer ones, and not a product of severity. 
Incident Length and Severity 
One would expect that the length of an incident might have influenced whether or 
not that incident was reported in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) and might influence 
severity rating. Presumably, short incidents might be easier to miss than longer 
ones and may be deemed less severe because they are over so quickly. 
Lifeguards’ reported severity ratings in the current study were not correlated with 
the length of the video clip in the current study, r(98) = .075, ns, or with the 
length of the original incident in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012), r(98) = .025, ns, 
although the reporting rate in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) was correlated to the length 
of the original incident, r(98) = .069, p < .001. A similar pattern was found for 
non-lifeguards, where their severity ratings were not correlated with the length of 
the video clip in the current study, r(98) = .015, ns, or with the length of the 
original incident in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012), r(98) = .018, ns, although the 
reporting rate in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) was correlated to the length of the 
original incident, r(98) = .410, p < .001. Thus, likelihood of noticing an incident 
is due to how long it occurs and not its severity. 
Qualitative Analysis of Severe Incidents 
To further explore the possibility that severe incidents went unreported in 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) due to attentional engagement with other stimuli as 
opposed to a lack of knowledge about severity, individual incidents were selected 
and analyzed. There were a total of nine incidents that had an average severity 
rating of 5 or higher among the lifeguards in the current study (see Table 1). The 
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most severe incident, according to lifeguards in the current study, was a group of 
approximately three to four swimmers far from the ocean shore, splashing and 
frequently submerging or disappearing behind the waves (mean severity 6.1 for 
lifeguards, 5.1 for non-lifeguards). This same event was reported by 60% of the 
lifeguard instructors but only 23.5% of the lifeguards and 15% of the non-
lifeguards in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012). Two related incidents, involving more 
pronounced submersion and less splashing in perhaps the same swimmers, was 
also rated severely in this study (mean severity 5.4 and 5.0 by lifeguards, 4.7 and 
4.0 by non-lifeguards). These incidents were highly reported by all participant 
groups in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012), most likely because the patrons truly appear to 
be struggling against the waves and do so for the entire two-minute video clip. As 
the previous analysis showed, the length of the incident often determined the 
likelihood that an incident was reported. 
Five of the nine incidents were all of a small group of men taking turns 
backflipping off of their friends’ shoulders (mean severity 5.7 by lifeguards, 5.0 – 
5.2 by non-lifeguards) or trying to jump up on their shoulders (mean severity 5.0 
– 5.1 by lifeguards, 4.0 – 4.2 by non-lifeguards). When isolated as in the current 
study, lifeguards (and non-lifeguards) appropriately rated each incident as at least 
moderately severe. In Lanagan-Leitzel’s (2012) study, the three backflip incidents 
all occurred within approximately one minute of time, thus reporting of the initial 
backflip was high (90% of lifeguard instructors although only 52.9% of 
lifeguards) but reporting of the later flips was drastically reduced. The two 
incidents where they were jumping on each other’s shoulders were in different 
video clips, so the reporting rate was moderate for both. In the field, a lifeguard 
would stop such dangerous behavior when it first occurred, if they correctly 
identified it as dangerous. Because these lifeguards were viewing only videos, 
they could not stop the incident from occurring again, even if they had identified 
it as severe. 
The remaining incident was a body floating in the ocean (mean severity 
5.6 by lifeguards, 4.4 by non-lifeguards). The body floating was underreported in 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012), perhaps because the incident was rather short (10 
seconds) or because it happened within the first 15 seconds of the video clip and 
the lifeguards may have been trying to observe everything in order to orient 
themselves to the scene, which included patrons at a great distance from the shore 
and a watercraft speeding past them. This incident best highlights how lifeguards 
might know what is critical, but if their attention is focused on other incidents, 
they may miss these incidents when they occur in the busy context of the field. It 
is unclear whether this event would have been monitored in Lanagan-Leitzel’s 
(2012) study had it lasted longer, and if so, how long it would have taken to draw 
attention. 
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Table 1. Incidents with the Highest Severity Rating 
 
Lifeguard  
Severitya 
Non-LG 
Severity 
Inst.b  LG  Non 
Incident Mean SD Mean SD % % % 
Far from shore; splashingc 6.13 0.97 5.08 1.75 60.0 23.53 5.08 
Shoulder stand/backflipd 5.74 1.57 5.15 1.51 90.0 52.94 50.0 
Shoulder stand/backflipd 5.74 1.36 5.02 1.42 70.0 17.65 5.0 
Shoulder stand/backflipd 5.70 1.74 5.19 1.53 70.0 0 0 
Body floating 5.61 1.62 4.42 1.95 20.0 5.88 20.0 
Far from shore; splashingc 5.43 1.65 4.74 2.01 70.0 29.41 35.0 
Jumping on shouldersd 5.09 1.56 4.23 1.53 20.0 47.06 30.0 
Far from shore; submersion/ 
splashingc 
5.00 1.65 4.02 1.84 60.0 41.18 50.0 
Jumping on shouldersd 5.00 1.81 4.03 1.44 40.0 29.41 15.0 
Far from shore; large wavesc 4.96 1.52 4.42 1.55 60.0 52.94 55.0 
Child struggling; deep water 4.74 1.89 3.92 1.78 20.0 0.00 0.0 
Far from shore; submersion 4.74 1.63 3.94 1.69 10.0 5.88 25.0 
Far from shore; splashing 4.70 2.27 4.35 2.18 40.0 5.88 5.0 
Throwing another person 4.61 1.83 3.50 1.39 20.0 0 0 
Far from shore; submersion 4.30 1.77 3.34 1.85 30.0 11.76 15.0 
Submersion; splashing 4.22 1.91 3.15 1.79 0 11.76 20.0 
Hanging onto other’s neck 4.22 2.26 3.32 1.81 40.0 17.65 15.0 
Deep water; race toward buoy 4.17 1.67 3.21 1.69 80.0 11.76 5.0 
Large group; high waves 4.09 2.00 2.97 1.82 60.0 47.06 30.0 
Throwing rock 4.04 1.61 2.71 1.70 30.0 0 20.0 
Submersion; delayed surfacing 4.00 1.88 3.15 2.00 0 52.94 5.0 
a Maximum severity rating is 7; 0 = no risk 
b Percent of participants (instructors, lifeguards, non-lifeguards) in Lanagan-Leitzel 
(2012) reporting this incident 
c These incidents were the same patrons 
d These incidents were the same patrons 
An additional 12 incidents were rated between 4 and 5 on the severity 
scale, making them moderately severe. Two of these incidents were highly 
reported in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) as participants indicated a large group of 
people in very wavy water (one incident involved the same patrons who were 
splashing in the incidents above). Ocean waves make it hard to see patrons clearly 
and can obscure submersion and thus drowning incidents. The clarity of the video 
at that distance did not compare with the resolution of the human eye, so this 
incident was harder for them to monitor. The additional concern reported by many 
in that study was that such a distance increased the difficulty of a rescue. This 
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suggested that the judgment of severity may take into account not only the visual 
assessment of the scene (the patron’s current behavior, past behavior, and 
environmental conditions) but perhaps also the lifeguard’s knowledge of and 
confidence in their own physical capabilities. I did not study this intriguing 
possibility in this study, but that is a question that future research ought to 
explore. 
Discussion 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) asked lifeguards and lifeguard instructors to identify 
incidents that were critical for a lifeguard to monitor from a series of video clips 
of swimming activity. Lifeguards were inconsistent in reporting these incidents; 
several purportedly-severe incidents (as rated by lifeguard instructors) were not 
reported by the lifeguards, nor did a high level of agreement exist across 
lifeguards in which incidents were reported. Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) offered two 
potential explanations – lifeguards may have lacked the knowledge of what was a 
critical/severe incident or they may have had their attention engaged in other 
simultaneous, but less severe incidents in the chaotic and busy aquatic contexts so 
that they missed these severe incidents when they occurred. 
The results of the current study suggested the latter explanation. When 
viewed in isolation, many of the incidents that lifeguard instructors originally had 
identified as severe but the lifeguards overlooked in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) were 
given appropriately high severity ratings in the current study. Thus, when 
attention was drawn to an incident, as it was in the current study, lifeguards were 
able to readily identify it as severe. Yet, when presented with the complex input 
that was characteristic of swimming venues presented in the original 2012 videos, 
lifeguards apparently made decisions about attention allocation from moment to 
moment that caused them to overlook potentially more serious incidents. This 
may mean that severe incidents regularly go unmonitored or unreported in real 
life situations, especially if there are other less severe incidents happening 
concurrently that divert attention. The lifeguard instructors in Lanagan-Leitzel 
(2012), being more experienced and expert than the lifeguards in that study, may 
have shifted attention more rapidly to cover more of the concurrent incidents 
and/or their experience may have allowed them to prioritize incidents more 
successfully. Those lifeguard instructors did report significantly more incidents on 
average than the lifeguards (instructors: M = 52.9 incidents, range = 25 to 121 vs. 
lifeguards: M = 25.2 incidents, range = 0 – 57), supporting the assessment that the 
experienced lifeguard instructors indeed had better and/or faster scanning skills. 
Limited-capacity human attention is a blessing and a curse. It allows us to 
attend to important and novel events, but in doing so, we must remove attention 
from other events. This is a fundamental purpose and nature of attention. Studies, 
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such as that conducted by Simons and Chabris (1999), have found that focusing 
attention on one event (a passed basketball) prevents participants from noticing a 
person dressed as a gorilla. Critically, the gorilla is obvious and detected if 
attention is not focused on the basketball. Lifeguards, despite their training 
received during certification and subsequent work experience, were affected by 
the same limitations of attention as non-lifeguards. The lifeguard’s only hope is to 
rapidly and continuously shift attention to try to monitor every patron in a timely 
manner. 
Attention can be driven to particular incidents of the lifeguard’s choice 
(“endogenous” attention shifts) but attention can also be “captured” away from 
these incidents by other salient incidents (“exogenous” attention shifts; see 
Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978 for several laboratory experiments investigating 
these shifts). These attention shifts are preceded by “disengagement” from one 
stimulus followed by “engagement” with a new one (Posner, Petersen, Fox, & 
Raichle, 1988). Laboratory research shows that expert pilots, for example, spend 
less time with their eyes stationary and make many more eye movements than 
novices (Bellenkes, Wickens, & Kramer, 1997). Because eye movements are 
often associated with attention shifts, this indicates that experts may be better able 
to disengage from one patron and shift their attention to a new one faster, 
permitting a better degree of coverage of a scene. 
It seems likely that the highly-experienced lifeguard instructors in 
Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) may have had an easier time shifting their attention 
quickly, allowing them to identify many more of the severe incidents in the video 
contexts than the less-experienced lifeguards. With less experience, attention 
shifts may be slower and fewer, perhaps also making them more susceptible to 
disruption by salient incidents in the scene that trigger exogenous attention shifts 
(e.g., someone shouting or suddenly splashing). The advantage of the current 
study is that the incidents were isolated and circled, which ensured that the 
participants were focusing their attention on them. 
Because lifeguards in Lanagan-Leitzel (2012) often reported that a 
patron’s distance from shore would make it difficult to perform a rescue, severity 
assessment may not be merely a visual judgment as studied here but may take into 
account physical skills of the individual lifeguard and other contextual factors. In 
other words, an experienced lifeguard may view an event as more severe if s/he 
anticipates that a rescue resulting from such an event is likely to be physically 
difficult to execute and may judge an event as less severe if s/he anticipates an 
easier rescue. An intriguing study by Moran (2014) explored how people 
perceived their competence to exit a pool under various conditions. In general, 
participants tended to overestimate their competence to exit the pool, and this 
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tendency was significantly stronger in males and when faced with a difficult exit 
(i.e., deep water bulkhead exit, after becoming tired from swimming, and when 
wearing clothing). Moran’s results suggested that people tended to overestimate 
their own physical capabilities and that this effect was more pronounced among 
males. Although Moran (2014) did not examine lifeguards specifically and their 
capability to perform a rescue in his study, it is possible that an inflated sense of 
capability/competence could be associated with deflated assessments of severity 
and thus a lack of or a delay in attentional engagement with severe incidents. This 
question should be examined in future research. 
Recommendations 
The results of this current study support two primary recommendations. First, it 
was clear that assessment of severity must rely on how attention is guided through 
the complex aquatic scene, and how that guidance changes as the incidents in the 
scene change. Future research should explore how expert lifeguards evaluate 
these incidents. Rather than simply teach lifeguards-in-training the behaviors 
associated with drowning and the environmental conditions that should cause 
them to worry (such as rip currents), explicit instruction should be offered on 
evaluation of severity changes over time and how the lifeguard should allocate 
attention across the area for which they are responsible. Essentially, what is 
needed is experiential decision-making training. The aquatic scene is constantly 
changing, and the assessment of severity changes from moment to moment; thus 
an effective lifeguard is one who can continually track multiple events by rapid 
shifts of attention as well as evaluate what is most severe at that moment and then 
monitor and respond to it accordingly. Future research should determine first how 
expert lifeguards adjust their surveillance (i.e., attention, scanning) according to 
their severity assessment. Then lifeguard training agencies need to explore how to 
best teach this process to new lifeguards so they have more advanced 
scanning/surveillance skills by the time they achieve certification. 
A second recommendation that emerged from the results of this study was 
that future research should attempt to study severity assessments at the moment 
they are occurring rather than rely on conscious behavioral report. Eye-tracking 
technology, for example, can record whether an incident is monitored, and if so, 
for how long. This research would enable a better distinction between incidents 
that are monitored but deemed non-severe and incidents that are never monitored 
at all. This sort of study also would be able to address the question of whether a 
scan path, as recommended by most lifeguard training manuals, is necessary for 
good surveillance or if it inappropriately locks lifeguards into an artificial pattern 
of monitoring that may disrupt their fluid severity assessments, obscure the timely 
attention to severe incidents, and ultimately impede them from acting promptly. 
11
Lanagan-Leitzel: Aquatic Incident Severity
Published by ScholarWorks@BGSU, 2019
Limitations 
There are several prominent limitations of this study. First, the stimuli were 
videos on a computer screen. This precluded the possibility of a rescue, so it 
doesn’t fully engender the motivations that face lifeguards on the stand and may 
not adequately reflect their normal on-the-job surveillance performance. Due to 
mechanical limitations, the videos were not as clear as the human eye can see, 
making it more difficult to identify incidents that occurred in the distance. Of 
course, the advantage of using videos instead of live-action incidents was that it 
ensured that each lifeguard and non-lifeguard participant received the exact same 
input and so that differences in their performance could be directly compared. 
Second, the lifeguards who participated were fairly uniform in their 
limited experience. Because the convenience sample was comprised of students 
taking psychology courses, many of these participants were freshmen or 
sophomores taking an introductory psychology course. Thus, they were young 
and the lifeguards had had relatively little lifeguarding experience (less than three 
years, on average, with over half reporting only summer work; using “years” as 
the temporal unit for quantifying experience likely resulted in over-estimating the 
actual time spent lifeguarding). Most of them had very little experience with 
open-water environments, and almost all were certified by the American Red 
Cross whose mission is focused primarily on certifying lifeguards for swimming 
pools. Thus, it is possible that different results might be achieved by studying 
lifeguards with more experience in other venues and who were certified by other 
agencies (such as the USLA or Ellis and Associates).  
Despite these limitations, I believe this study has begun to address the 
question of how lifeguards rate the severity of incidents as part of how to monitor 
them effectively. One likely explanation for missed incidents is attentional 
engagement on other incidents that distracts attention from a more severe 
incident. This finding, if supported by subsequent research, is more reassuring 
than a widespread lack of knowledge about what incidents are critical to monitor; 
however, this lack of knowledge gained from training points out the need to study 
this specific question further. Although people cannot simultaneously pay 
attention to everything, given the limited capacity of attention, experts are able to 
allocate their attention more effectively and rapidly to the most severe incidents 
and respond more quickly. Future research must explore this process and discover 
how to provide lifeguard candidates with more adequate observational 
surveillance training that will improve their attentional capacities and competence 
as they perform their surveillance duties. 
References 
American Red Cross (2007). Lifeguarding. Yardley, PA: Staywell. 
12
International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education, Vol. 10, No. 4 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ijare/vol10/iss4/7
DOI: 10.25035/ijare.10.04.07
Belenkes, A. H., Wickens, C. D., & Kramer, A. F. (1997). Visual scanning and 
pilot expertise: The role of attentional flexibility and mental model 
development. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 68, 569-579. 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10, 433-436. 
Brewster, B. C. (Ed.). (2003). Open water lifesaving: The United States 
Lifesaving Association manual (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Custom Publications. 
Cain, M. S., & Mitroff, S. R. (2013). Memory for found targets interferes with 
subsequent performance in multiple-target visual search. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 39, 1398-
1408. DOI: 10.1037/a0030726 
Cowen, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A 
reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 24, 87-185.  
Griffiths, T., Steel, D., & Vogelsong, H. (1996). Lifeguarding behaviors: A 
century of safety? Parks & Recreation, 31, 54–61. 
Hout, M. C., Walenchok, S. C., Goldinger, S. D., & Wolfe, J. M. (2015). Failures 
of perception in the low-prevalence effect: Evidence from active and 
passive visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 41, 977-994. DOI: 10.1037/xhp0000053 
Lanagan-Leitzel, L. K. (2012). Identification of critical events by lifeguards, 
instructors, and non-lifeguards. International Journal of Aquatic Research 
and Education, 6, 203-214. DOI: 10.25035/ijare.06.03.05 
Lanagan-Leitzel, L. K., Skow, E., & Moore, C. M. (2015). Great expectations: 
Perceptual challenges of visual surveillance in lifeguarding. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 29, 425-435. DOI: 10.1002/acp.3121 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits 
of our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81–
97. 
Moran, K. (2014). Getting out of the water: How hard can that be? International 
Journal of Aquatic Research and Education, 8, 321-337. DOI: 
10.25035/ijare.08.04.04 
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: 
Transforming numbers into movies. Spatial Vision, 10, 437-442. 
Posner, M. I., Nissen, M. J., & Ogden, W. C. (1978). Attended and unattended 
processing modes: The role of set for spatial location. In H. L. Pick & E. 
Saltzman (Eds.) Modes of perceiving and processing information (pp. 
137-158). New York, NY: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Posner, M. I., Petersen, S. E., Fox, P. T., & Raichle, M. E. (1988). Localization of 
cognitive operations in the human brain. Science, 240, 1627-1631. 
13
Lanagan-Leitzel: Aquatic Incident Severity
Published by ScholarWorks@BGSU, 2019
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained 
inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception, 28, 1059–1074. 
YMCA (2001). On the guard II: The YMCA lifeguard manual. Champaign, IL: 
Human Kinetics Publishers. 
14
International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education, Vol. 10, No. 4 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ijare/vol10/iss4/7
DOI: 10.25035/ijare.10.04.07
